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A lthough John Fowles has asserted that M antissa  was not m eant as 
a serious novel but as a kind o f literary jeu  d'esprit,' this disclaim er does 
not seem to sound absolutely convincing. The critics agree to a point that 
this w ork is no t “ typical Fow les,” m ainly in the sense o f narrative 
structure; nevertheless, m ost o f  them attach  far-reaching significance to it. 
David Lodge called the novel “an intriguing m etafiction,” and for M artin  
Amis it “ seeks to  explore the nature o f reality and creativity.” Indeed, the 
reader will find Mantissa hardly as engrossing as The M agus or The 
Collector; still, the novel employs literary motifs (though at some points 
utterly reversed) already present in French L ieutenant’s Woman, for instance.
The hero of the book, the novelist Miles Green, is first introduced in 
a hospital, as he is recovering from amnesia under the care o f an autocratic 
neuropsychologist D r Delfie. In  spite o f G reen’s protests, she imposes on him 
a kind o f sex-therapy -  which soon turns into a rape on the patient. In the 
following chapters, as a result o f numerous metamorphoses, D r Delfie takes on 
miscellaneous guises: from a doctor, through a nurse, a punk girl, a geisha, she 
develops into Erato, the muse. Concurrently, the abusive treatm ent ripens into 
an anim ating debate on literary theory. In the dispute, E rato  speaks for “old 
style” traditional literary approaches, while Green is shown as an advocate of 
self-conscious writing from the era o f deconstruction.
From  the very beginning the reader is notified that the usual presup­
positions for “ a novel by John  Fow les” should, in the case o f  this 
narrative, be put aside. The setting of the text -  a small grey hospital 
room  with quilted walls and padded dom ed ceiling -  is overtly m etaphorical:
' Cf: Michiko Kakutani, “Where John Fowles Ends and Characters of His Novels Begin” . 
New York Times, October 5, 1982. All quotations from Mantissa are from: John Fowles, 
Mantissa (London: Triad, 1982).
the reader is to deduce that the narrative takes place in the novelist’s mind. 
If we, like E rato , fail to draw  this conclusion, the inform ation is disclosed 
straightforw ardly, in a slightly reproachful manner:
‘I bet you haven’t even cottoned on to what these grey quilted walls really stand for—  
Grey walls, grey cells. Grey matter?’
’It’s a ll . .. talcing place inside your brain?’
’Brilliant.’ (114)
In this way, am ong others, Green places himself on an ontological level 
superior to  the one of E rato and the events narrated. Thus, he seems to 
employ a rather com m on postm odernist technique in which, using Brian 
M cH ale’s words, “ by breaking the frame around his world, the au thor 
foregrounds his own superior reality.” 2 Thus the text’s artificiality is laid 
bare in this way and there remains no sense o f any illusory reality o f the 
events recounted.
A further way o f accentuating the ontological status o f Mantissa  as 
a book is the foregrounding o f its physicality by m eans o f spatiotem poral 
references. At the beginning o f the treatm ent, D r Delfie explains to 
disoriented Green that he has been in hospital for “ju st a few pages” (19). 
Even though this statem ent is later disguised as checking his “ basic sense 
o f reality” after the amnesia, the reader is acutely stirred with its frank 
genuineness -  indeed, as a character in the book that we are reading, Miles 
Green has been with us for a few pages (nineteen in my edition). Later 
on, even D r Delfie -  E rato  succumbs to the system of m easuring passing 
time in pages, using phrases such as “ from the very first page o f my 
existence” (97), or “ I feel so terribly conscious I’m only a few pages o ld” 
(104). Green shares her awareness about the physicality o f the book, as he 
rem arks that the text which is being created is “ one hundred and eighty 
pages at least” (178) at the m om ent o f this declaration. Such allusions not 
only set the axis of time-flow against an opposing dimension o f spatial 
units, they also indicate the fact that Mantissa is a physical object, which, 
again typically o f postm odernism , “ has the effect of foregrounding the 
presence and m ateriality o f the book.”3
The “ object” that the reader is presented with consists of four parts- 
chapters. The first of them m arkedly stands out, being recounted in the 
past tense in opposition to the remaining three present-tense portions of 
the narrative. It is a t the end o f this chapter that the identity of Miles 
G reen as the au th o r becomes established. The nurse assisting in the 
controversial therapy shows a bundle of papers to  Green, and tells him
2 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Routlege, 1989), p. 197.
3 Ibid., p. 181.
“ I t’s a lovely little story. And you m ade it all by yourself” (47); then she 
reads aloud a few sentences which appear to be identical with the sentences 
that open the novel itself. In a metafictional paradox the fictionality of the 
text is foregrounded and the character of Green acquires authorial powers. 
Or, which m ay sound m ore convincing, he becomes a self-conscious au thor 
in the eyes o f the reader.
Having validated this position, Green can enjoy the freedoms which 
naturally spring from it. He recognises himself not only as a novelist, but 
as a postm odernist novelist, with all due rights. A ccording to M cH ale’s 
observation, postm odernist writers are obsessed with the analogy between 
the au thor and G od, and Green seems to exemplify the already quoted 
statem ent: “The postm odernist au thor arrogates himself to the powers that 
gods have always claimed.”4 Provoked by Erato, he self-assuredly announces: 
“I could always drag in a deus ex machina" (97), and ventures to  practice 
the art o f a conjurer, creating an ashtray, a lighter and a box o f cigarettes 
with “ three quick snaps of thum b and forefinger” (98). In the course of 
the narrative, Green is able to bring various objects in and out of existence, 
proving his divine, or perhaps just authorial, om nipotence.
G reen’s asserted control over the world o f the text manifests itself not 
only in his ability to create inanimate objects, but also in bringing to life 
characters appearing in the narrative. He consistently claims to have created 
his female interlocutor in all her guises, from a neuropsychologist to the 
muse. He invokes the process o f creating a character labelling her image 
an “ idea” and a “sketch” (53). M oreover, Green flaunts the dem onstration 
o f his creative abilities to the object of his divine fertility: he inform s Erato 
that she is a “fictional representation” (63), referring to  her and himself 
respectively as to “ the written and the w riter” (64). Such an overt m anifes­
tation of godlike powers focuses the reader’s attention on E ra to ’s status 
as a character in a text produced by an om nipotent, and boastful, author.
As for the muse, she frequently seems to reconcile herself to this 
position in the narrative, even if it requires acknow ledging a hardly 
reconcilable fact that “ the real ‘real m e’ is im aginary” (159). Speaking from 
her neuropsychologist’s knowledge, D r Delfie -  E rato conceives that her 
physical presence results merely from electro-chemical reactions taking place 
in G reen’s right cerebral lobe (137). This declaration, however, seems to 
contain an internal contradiction, since in the light of the fact that the 
whole story takes place in a metaphorical, not literal, setting, the “ physicality” 
o f her presence appears rather dubious. Nevertheless, when Green rather 
provokingly remarks: “Y ou’ve just shown you’ve a will o f your ow n," she 
submissively sighs: “ Hardly a will, I ’m afraid. Just a whisper of an instinct”
4 Ibid., p. 210.
(102). Thus she attests to  G reen’s om nipotence and his ability to  m anipulate 
her, as a character from his text, in the m anner o f a puppet-m aster.
However, at some points, E ra to ’s attitude is not at all that o f  humble 
resignation. She can be bold enough as to  reproach her au tho r that having 
been created by him is a “m isfortune” (89); further, her firmness leads her 
to  a daring declaration: “ I ’m just one m ore m iserable fantasy figure your 
diseased mind is trying to conjure up” (85). The reader can clearly detect 
E ra to ’s dissatisfaction with G reen’s m anner of structuring the plot, as she 
expresses disapproving comments on his m ethods (” I’m sick to death o f . .. 
having to pretend I exist in a way I never would, if I d id .” [88]), stressing, 
a t the same time, his superiority. W hen she com pares their powers and 
potentials she turns rather feminist, declaring “ 1 have absolutely no rights. 
The sexual exploitation’s nothing beside the ontological one” (93). H. W. 
Faw kner notes that “E rato  is totally dissatisfied with her au thor-parent 
Miles Green, accusing him first of m odern authorial indifference in allowing 
the text to write its immoral self, and then . . .  of the old-fashioned male 
novelist’s M achiavellian totalitarianism .”5 In the opinion of the critic, the 
muse blames the writer not only for the actions that he made her perform, 
but also for those that he let her perform  according to her, or the text’s 
itself, own whims. Finally, E rato even wishes Green were a character in 
a story as well, so that she could take revenge on him for all her calamities 
(55). In this explicit way she expresses her envy concerning his authorial 
powers and her vexation caused by the lack of them; her aspiration is to 
achieve a higher status, so that she could equal Green on the ontological 
level. W hen unable to  fulfil her wishes, she directs her anger at the whole 
genre, pointing out its disorderly state and expressing her pity that, 
contrary to  the opinion of m any, the novel is no t dead (67). This notion, 
led to  the extreme, develops into a universal statem ent that literature is 
m ental illness (140), which is supplemented by the m use’s m odest longing 
for the m arvellous time in the past before the alphabet and writing were 
invented (75).
Surprisingly for the reader, at some points of the text, Fowles provides 
the relation between Green and E rato with yet another twist: the muse 
becomes herself equipped with authorial powers. Given the m etaphorical 
setting of the narrative, she is able to self-consciously disregard the laws 
of nature (123), and at some points she approaches the issue o f omnipotence 
in a playful way: she can disappear physically from the surface-story, while 
controlling Miles at the same time (138), she can m ake various elements 
o f the textual world emerge or vanish (52, 150), or, finally, she even
5 H. W. Fawkner, The Timescapes o f John Fowles (London: Associated University Presses, 
1984), p. 136.
possesses the ability to change the writer into a satyr (184-186). She tries 
to impose her authority  on Green, either by the aggressive, self-assured 
enforcement o f her role as a m aster o f ceremonies (56), or by threatening 
to dem aterialise him (66). According to Faw kner, Miles G reen is being 
m anipulated, hence the critic considers him “ a victim o f the conspiracy of 
the text led by the m use.” 6 Correspondingly, the reader also feels somewhat 
deceived when Erato, recounting the story o f her sexual initiation vacillates 
in giving her age: she starts from fifteen (73), through fourteen (repeated 
twice 74-75), thirteen (78), twelve (79), to  finally reach the figure o f eleven 
(80). However, some of E ra to ’s authorial powers are used to a different 
end than m anipulation: prom pted by the writer, she invents an alternative 
story of her life and narrates part of it in detail (101-105). This dem onstrates 
her ability as a tale-spinner, which is admired even by Green: “ I t ’s amazing 
how you open up a whole new world in a few broad brushstrokes” (111).
In spite o f this, G reen’s appreciation for E ra to ’s talent at some points 
develops into an aversion. Aware o f the fact that he is being m anipulated, 
the novelist discerns the deficiencies in his own alleged om nipotence. When 
he tries to  bring back to  existence the door evaporated by the muse, he 
finds to his surprise that flicking his finger and thum b does not work. The 
textual reality of the narrative, which is supposed to be his own, will not 
yield to his wishes. Faw kner asserts that “ the novelist unwrites himself,” 7 
and that, contrary to  French Lieutenant’s Woman, “ it is not a question of 
au thor intruding into text, but o f text intruding upon au th o r.” “ A similar 
case is put forward by Burke, when the critic discusses the inadequacy of 
the au thor-G od  analogy. Pointing out th a t the all-em bracing infinite 
attributes of God (such as omnipotence or omnipresence) are not always 
valid for authors, Burke declares that “we can, w ithout contradiction, 
conceive o f au th o rs ... who do not hold a univocal m astery over their 
text.”9 Miles Green seems to utterly exemplify such sort of an author.
Furtherm ore, the conspicuous lack o f G reen’s control over the world 
o f his text suggests an analogy which could vividly delineate the interdepen­
dence between two elements o f the narrative process: the au tho r is given 
the characteristics of a pregnant woman, the text -  that o f  an unborn child 
in her womb. Fowles evokes this icon to the reader in the passage 
preceding the already quoted m om ent when Miles Green is presented with 
the papers containing the text and informed about his authorship. Prior to 
that, he is undergoing a “ therapy” for his amnesia which takes form of
6 Ibid., p. 154.
7 Ibid., p. 143.
* Ibid., p. 116.
’ R. Burke, The Death o f  the Author. Criticism and Subiectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 25.
a sexual intercourse with D r Delfie. To his utm ost astonishm ent, he is told 
to  keep “ a good steady rhythm ” (44) of m ovem ents, though not for mere 
carnal pleasure, but for the sake of his baby. From  this point on, the scene 
o f a sexual act becomes ambiguous: it can be alternatively read as that of 
labour, during which D r Delfie acquires the status o f a midwife. The nurse 
assisting her shows the text to  Green in a m anner that she would show 
an infant to  the m other, “ using the finger to trace the words, as she m ight 
have touched a new-born nose or tiny wrinkled lips” (48). Thus the writer 
becomes acquainted with his work, and the reader is given to  understand 
tha t his responsibility for it is, after all, limited. As Faw kner has observed, 
“Miles Green has no m ore conscious influence over the shaping o f the text 
than a pregnant woman has over the form ation of features in the growing 
foetus.” 10 H e has even less influence since the text has already been born.
A t this point there is to be noticed a striking analogy with B arthes’s 
conception divulged in his “The D eath  o f the A u thor.” After the au thor 
(m other) has written (given birth to) the text (baby), he or she loses control 
over it. Cutting the tie with the au thor is equivalent to  cutting the umbilical 
cord, from this point on the text becomes free and self-responsible. In 
B arthes’s words “As soon as a fact is narrated . . .  this disconnection 
occurs, the voice loses its origin, the au thor enters into his own death, 
writing begins.” 11
However, to be m ore precise, in M antissa  it is not the text itself that 
evades G reen’s control, but rather the character o f E rato , incited by her 
authorial inclinations. The dialogue between them, constituting the bulk of 
the novel, am ounts to  an extended argum ent over the creative power, in 
which, as M cHale puts it, “ both  parties . . .  claim to be the au thor of the 
other party, Green insisting tha t E rato  is a character in his writings, E rato 
countering that all his inventions come ultim ately from her.” 12 The critic 
then tries to speculate which of them is ontologically superior, whose 
fictional world is on a higher level; he postulates that the last chapter 
reveals both o f them to be co-authors, who pool their resources in an 
effort to  produce the script. In point o f  fact, the reader can construct the 
image of collaboration, given substantial textual evidence to this hypothesis. 
They are both definitely seeking compromise when they uniformly declare: 
“ If  we could only find some absolutely impossible . . .  text . . .  we could 
both be our real selves at last” (156-157). Nonetheless, a detailed analysis 
o f the discourse may lead to  the observation that the balance between 
bo th  parties is not perfect -  the scales are tipped in favour of
10 H. W. Fawkner, op. cit., p. 138.
11 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the A uthor,” in: Image Music Text, trans. Stephen 
Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 142.
12 B. McHale, op. cit., p. 214.
Green. It appears that he sets main routes for the story to follow, Erato is 
only responsible for technical details. Alternatively, she may be perceived as an 
actor performing in G reen’s scenario. This hypothesis is feasibly corroborated 
with the fact that a single female personality in the novel corresponds with 
several, utterly distinctive, characters. The writer frequently com m ents on 
fluctuations o f her identity depending on which ego she is currently occupying
-  which m ay as well be read: which role she is playing. She herself confesses: 
“ I’ve done my best . . .  to adapt myself to your ploddingly literal im agination” 
(142), in a m anner of a star unhappy with the part she has had to play.
In the view o f the foregoing judgem ents, M antissa can be inferred to 
dem onstrate that, depending on the discourse structure, the au thor figure
-  Miles Green -  need not necessarily construct the character -  E rato  -  but 
m ay as well be the product o f her creative powers. Obviously, the two 
personalities m ay be created by yet another party, external to the discourse. 
M cHale suggests that the third party is John Fowles, “ ultimately responsible 
for both of them and everything they do, say, write.” 13 For Fawkner, “Fowles 
conceives Green and E rato as a series o f masks or postures related to 
a conglom eration o f selves.” 14 The muse seems to possess some awareness of 
this, which she even discloses to the writer, hinting to him that he is also 
a character and somebody is pulling his strings (87). Thus, the consideration 
over the question whose ontological status is superior may as well be pointless, 
if we take into account the observation of E rato “ W e’re two people who 
happen to be locked in the same prison cell” (127), which sets both on a par 
with each other. Still, the third party, imagined to  have created the writer and 
the muse, remains concealed in the discourse; Mantissa is narrated covertly in 
the third person, with no outward signs of the n arra to r’s identity.
In fact, E rato’s supposition that both of them are characters in somebody’s 
story appears to be directly noticeable from the simplest possible perspective 
o f reading: if we open the book by John Fowles, we find both names in 
the text, and the spontaneous natural reaction is to treat Miles G reen and 
D r Delfie -  E rato  as characters. Thus Green has to suffer from the 
com m on postm odernist affliction experienced by all authors who resolve to 
short-circuit the ontological levels and appear in their text. In her study 
on m etafictional writing, Patricia W augh observes:
What happens . . .  when [the writer] enters [the world of the narrative] is that his or her
own reality is also called into question. The ‘author’ discovers that the language of the
text produces him or her as much as he or she produces the language of the text.'s
13 Ibid., p. 215.
14 H. W. Fawkner, op. cit., p. 32.
15 Patricia Waugh, Metafiction. The Theory and Practice o f  Self-Conscious Fiction (London: 
Routledge, 1984), p. 133.
M cHale considers this one o f the crucial aspects o f John Fowlcs’s novel:
Mantissa . . .  foregrounds a fact [that] the inscribed author is always a fiction, a “paper- 
author” as Barthes says. . . .  As soon as the author writes himself into the text, he 
fictionalises himself, creating a fictional character bearing [his] name . . .  who is formally 
transworld-identical with himself, while the author himself withdraws to a further remove 
from the world of the text. . . .  The ontological barrier between an author and the interior 
o f his fictional world is absolute, impenetrable.16
W augh has even tried to evaluate the extent o f authorial presence in 
m etafictional texts, and her conclusion that “ [t]he m ore au tho r appears, the 
less he or she exists” 17 shows Miles Green in a quite uncharitable light.
Indeed, since the m om ent when the position of G reen as the au thor is 
established towards the end o f the first section of the novel, his presence 
on the ontological level o f the text becomes perpetual, even despite the 
fact tha t this level is apparently alien to  him. Faw kner notices that in 
M antissa the proportions between narrative and intrusion are reversed, 
accentuating the unconventionality o f the situation in which “ it is the 
polym orphic character who interrupts the novelist.” 18 In point o f fact, only 
the first chapter is organised according to a linear plot, the rest o f the 
novel consists of a prolonged debate on writing and verbal struggle for 
authorial powers between the two individuals. Fowles pushes to extremes 
the standard that “ [m]etafictional novels which hand on to the concept of 
au tho r as inventor of the text . . .  exaggerate authorial presence in relation 
to story or inform ation” 19: in Mantissa there is hardly any story, and there 
are hardly any passages free from authorial presence. In  this way, the 
structure o f the novel comes forth  as an additional factor testifying to  the 
absurdity  o f G reen’s, or E ra to ’s, position as the au thor. Surprisingly 
enough, both  the writer and the muse are also inclined to  perceive the lack 
o f balance of proportions within the text. In their case, however, the 
emphasis is laid on a different aspect: their impression is that the literary 
debate is an intrusion, and core of the narrative lies in experiencing various 
alternatives o f a sexual act: “There were whole stretches today with hardly 
a whisper of sex. I sometimes feel we’re losing all sense of priorities” (162).
Likewise, for Faw kner “the infinite num ber of possible erotic positions 
comes to m irror the infinite num ber o f narrative alternatives, the terrifying 
freedom of an endless am ount of authorial postures. . . .  Fowles focuses on 
the difficulty of choosing a single path .”20 In truth, Mantissa does concentrate
16 B. McHale, op. cit., p. 215.
17 P. Waugh, op. cit., p. 134.
'* H. W. Fawkner, op. cit., p. 137.
19 P. Waugh, op. cit., p. 131.
20 H. W. Fawkner, op. cit., p. 135.
on having various potentialities of leading the story. The text abounds in 
references to the variations o f the plot which the reader is not given in 
the novel, but which are well remembered and discussed by Green and 
Erato (160, 182), and some o f them are even given reference numbers. 
However, none of the num erous options present in the surface story is 
fully accomplished, and the story remains recursive. 1 his quality o f M an­
tissa brings to  mind the branching o f narrative in Borges’s “ 1 he Garden 
o f Forking Paths,” though in Fowles’s novel none of the paths is really 
taken.
As we can see, Fowles systematically deconstructs his narrative, depriving 
the reader o f all custom ary footholds expected in the world o f fiction. 
Unsafe and unsound, we are left to the whims o f two capricious surrogate 
authors, whose aim is also to produce an “ unwritable . . .  unfinishable . . .  
unim aginable . . .  endlessly revisable . . .  text w ithout w ords” (157). 1 he 
result o f their concerted efforts is “an unwritable non-text” (178), a hopeless 
precipice for the reader who tries to approach the novel in a non-absurd 
way. D eciding to reverse standard  m etafictional schemes, Fow les has 
m anaged to achieve a substantial result. As Faw kner observes,
If the trend in the genre has been to write fiction about writing fiction and to write 
^fiction about the difficulty of writing fiction, Mantissa would seem to carry this movement 
; to its uttermost extreme in being fiction about the impossibility of writing fiction. 
Certainly failure is an im portant motif, for the narrative structure is that of an endlessly 
I. interrupted nontext.21
Fowles shapes the character of Miles Green as that o f anti-author, 
exaggerating in his personality the traits o f au thors, or non-au thors, 
imposed on them by the tenets of deconstruction. Green pronounces himself 
an advocate of this theory, and tries to persuade E rato  of its relevance; 
he m akes himself very explicit, instructing her alm ost in the form of 
a quasi-lecture:
Serious modern fiction has only one subject: the difficulty of writing serious modern 
fiction. First, it has fully accepted that it is only fiction, can only be fiction, will never 
be anything but fiction, and therefore has no business at all tampering with real life or 
reality. . . .  Second. The natural consequences of this is that writing about fiction has 
become a far more important matter than writing fiction itself. I t ’s one of the best ways 
you can tell the true novelist nowadays. . . .  Third, and most im portant. At the creative 
level there is in any case no connection whatever between author and text. They are two 
entirely separate things. Nothing, but nothing, is to be inferred or deduced from one to 
the other, and in either direction. The deconstructivists have proved that beyond the 
shadow of doubt. The author’s role is purely fortuitous and agential. (117)
21 Ibid., p. 134.
However, following the guidelines laid down by deconstructionists does 
not seem a very promising path for Green. Trying to pursue these principles, 
he produces an absurd and incoherent non-narrative which does not 
necessarily reflect the absurdity and incoherence o f hum an existence, but 
merely its own infertility. Faw kner interprets G reen’s efforts to overcome 
his am nesia and recollect his identity as a m etaphor for “ the contem porary 
novelist’s attem pt to define and recover that creative autonom y which the 
deconstructionists would seem to deny h im .” 22 N onetheless, it can be 
postulated that, even when the writer regains his original self, not quite 
through his conscious exertion, he applies its creative powers to producing 
an unsubstantial non-text.
Consequently, it becomes perceptible that Fowles is using a considerable 
supply o f irony against Miles Green. He takes up G reen’s line of argum ent 
and lets it develop freely, but only within strictly set boundaries o f logical 
reasoning. The inevitable result is absurd: G reen is proved to be a barren 
au thor, the text composed by him -  an example of unproductiveness. 
C ontrary to the model “ serious m odern fiction” prescribed in G reen’s 
post-structuralist opinion, M antissa is a text about the absurdity o f  writing 
about the impossibility o f  writing fiction.
Actually, Fowles’s literary oeuvre proves to his readers that creating 
fiction is a conceivable task. In his previous novels (as well as in The 
M aggot which follows Mantissa), the writer dem onstrates that the well- 
structured “ story” is a crucial aspect of his writing. All his books have 
rem arkably elaborate plots, abounding in unpredictable turns; his characters 
are well-developed and convincing; the world o f the narrative is always 
pleasingly meticulous, overflowing with richness o f detail. The reviewers 
praise Fowles for being “ adm irable and immensely successful as a suspense- 
engineer,”23 and, what is also w orth pointing out here, his novels are sold 
in millions copies around the world, not necessarily by lowbrow audiences. 
F o r all those reasons, we are far from wrong if we assume that when 
E rato , contrary  to the widely-accepted opinion, denies the death  o f the 
novel, she speaks for Fowles’s mind.
In the light of the foregoing arguments, it can be postulated that John 
Fowles is an adversary of a post-structuralist conviction that “ the au thor 
is dead;” he stresses the im portance o f authorial presence in the text, as 
well as authorial reading of it. Fowles’s viewpoint on the deconstructive 
approach to  literature would rather tend to  come closer to that of G raham
22 Ibid., p. 137.
23 Benjamin De M ott, “The Yamsmith in Search of H imself’, New York Times, August 
29, 1982.
M cCann who defies the key role o f free critical reading in creating the 
text, noticing its excessive arbitrariness:
Dcconslruction is not incorrect in saying that the critic is creative; where it is disastrously 
wrong, however, is in its assumption that creativity means freedom from constraints and 
from standards of judgement operating on its results. . . .  To be creative is not let one’s 
imagination run wild: it is to use one’s imagination productively.3*
It has to be observed, however, that Fowles’s disparagement o f deconstructive 
theory in Mantissa does not take form o f a theoretical treatise, nor even 
o f polemic discussion. In  trying to be as “ reader-friendly” as possible in 
this context, the novelist employs irony and sense o f hum our in place of 
argum entative discourse. Fowles simply ridicules the notion that the text 
can write itself, he m akes fun of the conception th a t the au th o r is 
non-author. Given the absurdity which results from the appearance o f such 
a self-writing, unwritable non-text, together with the critical opinions that 
emphasise the artificiality of the au thor inscribed in the narrative, we can 
concur with Faw kner’s opinion that in Mantissa “ the deconstructivists are 
outdeconstructed.”25
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